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Entrepreneurs and new ideas
Abstract:
We study how early stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas
can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to
market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas the entrepreneur needs to hire experts
who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the
risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea-thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he
should in turn steal the idea. Thus stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the
information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary. In such cases the entrepreneur
can form a partnership with the experts, thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other’s
information.Yet, very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them.
JEL Keywords: Innovation and invention, Entrepreneurship, Intelllectual Property Rights, Con-
tracts, Incentives.
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Entrepreneurs and new ideas
1 Introduction
Successful business creation requires that unprofitable projects be weeded out.3 To screen an untried
idea, each of its components must be assessed: its technical feasibility, the extent of the potential
market or specific features of customer demand, its compliance with regulations, the ability to secure
the necessary property rights, and the identification of contacts to access scarce logistic or managerial
resources. These components are likely to be highly complementary, since the failure of the idea along
even a single dimension may be sufficient to reveal that it is not viable. Thus entrepreneurs with
novel concepts need to identify the critical dimensions along which the idea must be assessed, and
then secure the collaboration of relevant experts for screening.
The need for collaboration, at the early stage of the entrepreneurial process, has been emphasized
by the sociology of sciences. Innovation is a process which relies crucially on the interaction between
several individuals (see Dodgson, 1993, Callon, 1989 and Latour, 1979). De Koning and Muzyka
(2001) analyse the success factors in the approach of serially successful entrepreneurs and identify
“the iterative process in discussing, investigating and evaluating ideas.” They note that: “the building
of business concepts could not be conducted in isolation.” Bhide (2000) cites the reliance on experts as
a success factor in a number of daring new enterprises. Aldrich (1999) reports that founding teams of 4
or 5 people are common in start-ups in knowledge intensive industries, and a 70 % median percentage
of start-up firms with two or more full-time partners. Mustar (1998) reports that almost all French
high—tech start-ups initiated by scientists involve partners with complementary skills. Entrepreneurs
usually associate former colleagues, scientific advisors, and people with industry experience. This takes
3For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, a survey estimated that only one out of 10,000 screened molecules turn
out to be useful (The Economist, 2002). It concluded that: “Ideally, companies should be catching potential failures and
terminating them in the early discovery phase.”
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place at the early stage of the innovation process, well before financiers such as venture capitalists
become involved.
Yet interaction with experts raises the risk that the better ideas, once communicated, may be
stolen.4 Innovative ideas at an early stage of elaboration cannot be protected by patents, hence the
idea—stealing problem is much more acute than in the case of more established and formalized ideas. A
striking example is offered by the case of Robert Kearns. He offered his idea of the intermittent wind—
shield sweeper to Ford, which declared no interest in the concept. Within months, Ford introduced
wind—shield sweepers in its cars.5 Innovating entrepreneurs are extremely concerned with confiden-
tiality issues (Anton, and Yao, 1994, 2002, 2003, 2004; Ueda, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2001).6 De
Koning and Muzyka (2001) report a diffuse concern among entrepreneurs that “open discussions could
lead to costly theft of ideas and opportunities.” They report the case of an entrepreneur who “needs
to discuss ideas with his partners and others ... Without 100% confidence that others will not steal his
ideas he would not be able to discuss and therefore would not be as successful.” Thus, entrepreneurs
are faced with a dilemma similar to Arrow’s (1962) paradox: On the one hand, potential buyers are
not willing to pay before being told the idea and checking its value. On the other hand, they no longer
need to pay for the idea once they have been told it.
Anton and Yao (1994) offer a solution to this paradox. They analyze how the seller of the idea
can secure rents by credibly threatening to destroy the profits of thiefs by transmitting the idea
to competitors. Cestone and White (1998) and Baccara and Razin (2002) also emphasize how the
threat of competition can deter information leakage and idea stealing. Anton and Yao (2002 and
2004) enrich these analyses by considering partial disclosure of ideas and by analysing the choice
4 Idea stealing is not an issue if the innovator is necessary to the development of the idea (Callon, 1989).
5See also the HBS "X-it" business case, concerning the appropriation by a producer of a novel design in fire escape
which it had been offered to purchase.
6According to Bhide’, over 70 % of the founders of firms in the Inc 500 list of fast growing young firms replicated or
modified ideas encountered in their previous employment. Besen and Raskind (1991) discuss how difficult it is to legally
protect intellectual property rights.
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between patents and secrecy. An alternative solution is to control access to knowledge, as in Rajan
and Zingales (2002) where the internal organization of the firm is designed to deter idea-stealing by
employees. In Hellmann and Perotti (2004), firms restrict the circulation of ideas in order to capture
their value. We complement this literature by showing that the entrepreneur can take advantage of
the complementarity between the different dimensions of her innovative idea to mitigate the risk of
idea—stealing.
To conduct this analysis, we develop the following simple model. The entrepreneur has an in-
novative idea, which is not yet patentable. The idea requires evaluation on two dimensions. The
entrepreneur presents the idea to the experts, who privately observe signals on whether the project
is viable, along their own line of expertise. The entrepreneur must extract this private information
from the two experts, without letting them steal the idea. The entrepreneur offers to compensate the
experts contingent on the profit of the venture, if it is implemented. To ensure that the appraisal is
reliable, two conditions must hold. It is necessary that i) the experts do not falsely report a good signal
when they have observed a bad one, and that ii) they prefer to join the venture rather than stealing
the idea. The offer made by the entrepreneur to the experts can be interpreted as a partnership, to
be implemented when the two experts report positive signals.
The key insight is that idea-stealing is constrained by its very nature. Suppose the first expert
decides to steal the idea. Could he obtain information on the complementary dimension of the project?
Since his expertise is known, by proposing to undertake the venture he reveals he observed a good
signal. Having learned this, the second expert does not need him any longer. She can steal the
idea to implement it herself. Hence, any expert tempted to steal the idea realizes he would need to
undertake the project alone, without benefitting from further advice. This reduces the attractiveness
of idea—stealing.
Thus, when the project is profitable only when two signals are good, the entrepreneur is able to
form a partnership and avoid idea—stealing. In contrast, when an expert could profitably undertake
the project alone after observing a good signal, idea—stealing is a real issue. This can lead to a market
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breakdown, in line with Arrow’s (1962) paradox.
In addition, we also show that, if the entrepreneur can commit to an aggressive investment policy,
pledging to undertake the project as soon as one expert accepts to join helps deterring idea—stealing.
In this case, each expert knows that, if he steals the idea, he risks to compete with the entrepreneur
when implementing the project. This reduces the attractiveness of idea—stealing, in line with previous
analyses or the disciplining role of competition (see, Anton and Yao (1994), Cestone and White (1998)
and Baccara and Razin (2002)). Note also that this rationalizes why such traits such as determination,
obstinacy and overconfidence, would be associated with entrepreneurship. They help preventing idea
appropriation.
Our paper complements the analyses of Aghion and Tirole (1994), Hellmann (2000) and Casamatta
and Haretchabalet (2002), which do not consider the risk of idea stealing. Our approach is consis-
tent with Lazear’s (2002) findings (using a sample of Stanford MBAs with their education history)
that entrepreneurs are typically nonspecialists with training or skills in different areas, and that an
important aspect of their task is to combine talents. Similarly in our analysis, the entrepreneur is not
an expert, but rather someone who knows enough about related aspects of the business to see some
potential functional fit among existing resources, and needs specialists for advice and implementation.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which the entrepreneur
can avoid idea stealing and describes the equilibria arising in our model. Section 4 discusses the
robustness of the results. Section 5 outlines empirical implications of our theoretical analysis. We
point out, e.g., that innovative enterprises should associate complementary experts as partners rather
than consultants; that associating experts enhances the chances of success; and that the share of
the initial entrepreneur should be relatively high in complex high technology ventures with high
complementarities. Section 6 offers a brief conclusion. The proofs are in the appendix.
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2 Model
Assumptions
Ideas New ideas combine productive means in several dimensions. For simplicity we consider two
dimensions only. The first dimension could correspond to a technological concept while the other could
correspond to a business concept. An example is offered by Federal Express. Its founder, Frederick
Smith, “had a bold vision for a company that would operate a national network of jets, trucks and
personnel to provide reliable overnight delivery of letters and small packages” (Bhidé, 2000). Here we
can think of the first dimension as the set of transportation techniques, and the second dimension as
the demand for rapid post delivery.
Agents We define an entrepreneur as an agent endowed with a promising idea. Ideas are not
always valuable. To be profitable, they must be feasible along each of the two dimensions. For example,
before launching Federal Express, F. Smith had to find out if his idea was technically feasible, if planes
and trucks could actually be used in combination to efficiently ship express mail, and also if there was
sufficient demand for such a service.
The entrepreneur lacks the specialized knowledge to ascertain the feasibility of her idea and hence
must obtain advice from specialized experts. In the case of Federal Express, Frederick Smith commis-
sioned a study from A.T. Kearney: “Smith really wanted to know if the concept was practical” said
the consultant who led the study (see Bhidé, 2000).
We assume that expertise is observable. Experts have an observable track record of academic
and business achievements reflecting their skills. They are known for their participation in previous
innovative ventures and the jobs they held previously reflect their technical skills. Furthermore, experts
tend to know each other, at least by reputation.
At cost L, the entrepreneur can contact an expert and describe her idea. L corresponds to the cost
of contacting the expert, presenting the idea in a clear and structured way, and also the compensation
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of the expert for the time spent listening to the entrepreneur and evaluating the project. After being
presented the project and after the cost L has been incurred, each expert observes his private signal.
The entrepreneur contacts two experts, specialized in the two dimensions, x and y respectively. In
line with the notion that the two signals correspond to different dimensions of the idea, we assume
they are ex—ante independently distributed. Denote the signals: X˜ and Y˜ . Each private signal can
be good (in which case it takes the value 1) or bad (corresponding to X or Y = 0). Expert x (resp.
y) receives a good signal with probability πx (resp. πy) or a bad signal with the complementary
probability. Since we allow πx and πy to be different, the signals have different significance.
Cash flows The entrepreneur obtains the idea and contacts the experts at time 1. If the project
is undertaken, it can generate cash flows at time 2. For simplicity we normalize the discount rate to 1.
If both experts observe good signals, the idea is excellent. In that case, if only one firm implements the
project, at time 2 it generates revenues equal to H with probability μ or h with the complementary
probability, with H > h.7 If the project is operated by more than one firm, each stands to generate
lower revenues because of competition. To take this into account in the simplest possible way, we
assume that, under competition, revenues are scaled down by a factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. If one of the signals
is good and the other is bad, then the cash flow at time 2 is h, if the project is implemented by only
one firm, while competition scales the revenues of each firm down to δh. Finally, if both signals are
bad, the project yields zero cash flow.
Denote H(., .) the function mapping the two signals into the expected time 2 cash flows, when
the project is implemented by a single firm: H(1, 1) = μH + (1 − μ)h, H(1, 0) = H(0, 1) = h, and
H(0, 0) = 0. Since by assumption the two signals play a symmetric role in the expected cash flow,
slightly abusing notations, we can rewrite the function simply as a function of the number of signals
that are good (n): H(n), n ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
7The residual uncertainty with two good signals is not necessary, but raises the possibility to distinguish different
types of financial claims, such as debt or equity for example.
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Associated to each dimension of expertise is a resource (reflecting specialized human, physical or
financial capital) which needs to be contributed at time 1 for the implementation of the idea. We
assume that such resources can be contributed by the experts at cost c, if they agree to participate.
For simplicity, we describe this resource contribution as observable and contractible, ruling out any
moral hazard. Thus we focus only on the adverse selection problem in aggregating privately observed
expert signals. We consider the case where the development cost (2c) is paid by the experts. In a
previous draft of the paper we showed that our results were robust to an arbitrary division of this cost
between the entrepreneur and the experts.
Complementarity Although the signals play symmetrical roles, they are not substitutes; rather
they correspond to the two different dimensions along which the project must be evaluated, and thus
can be complementary.8 Complementarity arises if the cash flow function H(n) is convex. Convexity
means that the marginal increase in value implied by a positive signal is greater if the other signal is
also positive, or, more formally:
H(2)−H(1) = (μH + (1− μ)h)− h ≥ H(1)−H(0) = h,
that is: H ≥ 1+μμ h.We assume this inequality holds, to focus on the complementary case, which we
believe to be the most realistic for innovative projects. The argument is that in an innovative project,
both components of the idea must have a good functional fit, so that if one fits but the second does
not, the concept is worth much less.
An extreme form of complementarity is when the project generates positive cash flows only if both
signals are good (i.e., h = 0). For example, a start—up would generate a positive cash flow only if its
product is technically feasible and there is a sufficient market for it. In that case the signals enter
in the value function in a multiplicative form, i.e.: H(X,Y ) = XY μH, which corresponds to the
case of maximum convexity of the cash flow function H(n). Arguably, this case probably describes
8This differs from the typical assumption in the analysis of financial prices under heterogeneous information, where
signals are equal to the sum of a common underlying value and individual noise.
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particularly complex ideas, in which each dimension of the idea “must fit exactly”. At the opposite
extreme is the case where the cash flow function H(n) is linear in the number of good signals, which
arises if H = 1+μμ h. In this additive case, a second positive signals adds just as much as the first. The
cash flow as a function of n is graphically represented in Figure 1. (Note that the sequence of signals
does not matter).
To assess the effect of changes in the degree of complementarity, it is convenient to consider a
change in h compensated by a change in H, such that the expected cash—flow from the project when
the two signals are positive remains constant. Denote  this change in h (i.e., h goes to h− ). The
corresponding change in H is 1−μμ  (i.e., H goes H +
1−μ
μ ). The greater , the more convex the
resulting function, the more complementary the signals.
Net Present Value If the project is undertaken by a single firm, without any advice from the
experts, its expected net present value is:
E(H(X˜, Y˜ ))− 2c = [πxπy(μH + (1− μ)h) + (πx(1− πy) + πy(1− πx))h]− 2c. (1)
We assume that this ex—ante net value is negative. On the other hand, if the entreprenur consults the
experts and both signals are good, the expected net present value of the project implemented by a
single firm is positive:
E(H(X˜, Y˜ )|X = 1, Y = 1)− 2(c+ L) = μH + (1− μ)h− 2(c+ L) > 0. (2)
Note that, in contrast with the case where no expert was consulted (corresponding to equation (1)),
the cost of expert consultation is included in condition (2). We assume that, after observing that
one of the two signals is positive and the other negative, the net value of the project is negative, i.e.:
h < 2c. This assumption is in line with our focus on the complementary case, and obviously holds in
the multiplicative case (where h = 0). To allow for positive net value conditional on two signals in the
additive case (i.e. when the function H(n) is linear), we also assume that h > c+ L.
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Designing the partnership The creative role of entrepreneurs in our model has two aspects: First,
entrepreneurs have innovative ideas. Second, entrepreneurs initiate the process of venture formation:
they contact experts, elicit their information and form a partnership. To model this second aspect,
we take a principal agent approach. The entrepreneur, who initiates the venture, is the principal, and
designs the contract. The experts, who observe private signals, are the agents. The contract must be
designed so that their incentive compatibility and participation constraints hold.9
The entrepreneur presents her idea and offers the contract to the experts, separately and simul-
taneously. The contract describes the project, the compensation of the experts contingent on joining
and their resource commitments. The entrepreneur signs this contract before offering it to the experts,
thus she can commit to the offer. The experts answer with announcements about their private signals.
The challenge for the entrepreneur is to elicit truthful revelation of these signals and to prevent the
experts from stealing the idea.10 The contract involves a decision rule mapping the announcements
of the experts into the decision to undertake in the project or not. If the project is undertaken, the
experts must commit their resources, at cost c. The mechanism also specifies the compensation of the
experts, when the project is undertaken. This is a transfer function contingent on the final realization
of the cash flow and the announced signals. The total transfer is between 0 and the realized cash flow.
For simplicity, this cash flow is assumed to be observable and contractible.
Once the two signals have been observed, the project has positive net present value only if both
signals are positive. Hence, under truthful reporting, the only renegociation proof policy is to imple-
ment the project if and only if the two reports are positive and the entrepreneur obtains non negative
expected returns. In our main analysis, we focus on this renegociation—proof policy. In Section 4,
we investigate the optimal mechanism arising when the entrepreneur can commit ex—ante to policies
9Strictly speaking, our principal is privately informed. But in the consultation phase the experts observe the idea.
From that point on, we are in the standard uninformed principal case. This contrasts with Anton and Yao (2002) where
the entrepreneur needs to signal her type.
10At this preliminary stage of the innovation process, the idea is still too general and ahead of actual implementation
to be patentable. Only after being actually implemented is the idea concrete enough to be protected by a patent.
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which are not renegociation proof ex—post. There, we show how the entrepreneur can rely on this
commitment power to implement more aggressive investment strategies, useful to deter idea—stealing.
When the decision rule is to undertake the project if and only if the two reports are good the
contract can be summarized by two transfers function contingent on the final cash flow: ϕx(.) and
ϕy(.). The mechanism design problem for the entrepreneur is to choose ϕx(.) and ϕy(.) to maximize
her expected gains:
πyπx[μ(H − ϕx(H)− ϕy(H)) + (1− μ)(h− ϕx(h)− ϕy(h))]− 2L,
subject to the participation constraints of the experts, requiring that their expected compensation be
at least as large as the development cost they incur:
μϕi(H) + (1− μ)ϕi(h) ≥ c for i ∈ {x, y}, (3)
and the condition that the experts truthfully report their type.
In line with our principal agent approach, the entrepreneur makes a take it or leave it offer to the
experts when he offers them the contract. If condition (3) holds as an equality for expert i, then this
expert just breaks even. But, as shown below, for certain parameter values incentive compatibility
implies that informational rents must be left to the experts. In that case, the entrepreneur does not
have all the bargaining power, in the sense that he does not capture the entire net present value of the
project. Thus, by computing the informational rents of the experts, we characterize their endogenous
bargaining power.
To conclude the presentation of our model, and clarify the timing of the moves, we briefly sum-
marize the extensive form of the game. At the beginning of time 1, the entrepreneur obtains the idea.
Then, she can contact the experts, and present them her idea and the contract at cost 2L. After being
told the idea, the experts privately observe their signals and separately and simultaneously report
their type to the entrepreneur. If both experts report a good signal, they join the partnership, and
contribute the resource necessary to the development of the project (at cost c). Instead of joining the
partnership, each expert can steal the idea. In that case, he can then implement the idea alone, or
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contact another expert, in order to obtain information relevant along the complementary dimension
of the idea. At time 2, if the project has been undertaken, cash flows are obtained. If the partnership
has been formed, the transfers conditional on these cash flows are distributed.
3 New ideas in equilibrium
In this section we study when the formation of the partnership and the implementation of the new
idea are feasible.
Preventing gambling The entrepreneur must prevent the expert with a bad signal from reporting
a good signal. Since even after a bad signal there is a chance that the project will produce cash—flow
h, the expert might claim a positive signal to “gamble” on a positive signal by the other expert. Since
when he truthfully reports a bad signal he gets 0, the expert has no incentive to falsely pretend he
had a good signal if:
πi(ϕj(h)− c) ≤ 0, (i, j) ∈ {(x, y), (y, x)}.
This condition implies that the entrepreneur must promise only limited cash flow to the experts in
the bad state h, i.e., cash flow lower than the cost of the resource c. Hence, the structure of the claim
held by the experts has to be payoff-contingent to ensure reliability. Furthermore, since the expert
has to receive less than c in the low state to avoid gambling, he must be receiving more than c in the
high state to break even. Thus we can state our first proposition:
Proposition 1: The compensation of the expert is increasing in the cash—flows generated by the
project.
This is consistent with the entrepreneur offering the experts to join a partnership, as discussed
further at the end of this section.
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Preventing idea stealing Suppose that expert x has a positive evaluation of the project. Instead
of reporting this positive signal and joining the partnership, he could decide to report a bad signal to
deter the entrepreneur from engaging in the venture. Then the expert would undertake the project
without the entrepreneur. This would amount to stealing the entrepreneur’s idea.11
The risk of idea stealing could be mitigated if the experts could sign a no-compete clause before
hearing the idea. Signing such a clause related to the specific idea without learning the idea itself
is logically impossible. This leaves open the issue whether the experts could sign a broader clause,
committing them not to start any project in the general line of business. In the first part of the paper
(Section 3), we simply assume this is not possible. While this assumption is in line with the difficulty
to enforce no compete clauses in practice (see, e.g., Besen and Raskind, 1991), in Section 4 we also
analyze the case where no compete clauses can be enforced. In that section, we assume that, while
some of the potential entrepreneurs really have observed promising ideas, others in fact have observed
worthless ideas. Until they have inspected the idea, the experts cannot tell if the entrepreneur is really
serious. Thus they do not want to restrict their future options and be at risk of being blackmailed
(see Anton and Yao, 2003). This limits their willingness to sign broad no—compete clauses ex—ante.
Should the expert decide to steal the idea, he could use it in two different ways. First, he could
set up the firm and exploit the idea without involving another expert for further appraisal. In this
case he would supply his own effort (at cost c), and he could acquire the complementary resource at
the market price c.12 The corresponding expected profit of the expert would be:13
E(H(X˜, Y˜ )|X = 1)− 2c = πy(μH + (1− μ)h) + (1− πy)h− 2c.
11The idea can be stolen because it is too preliminary to be patented. This is in line with the evidence, surveyed in
Besen and Raskind (1991), that it is difficult to protect intellectual property rights. See also Anton and Yao (2003).
12Our assumption that this effort can be purchased is in line with our assumption that it is observable and contractible.
13 If the expert steals the idea and implements it, the entrepreneur cannot observe this until the end of the period and
the cash flow realization. At this point, since he has concretely implemented the idea, the expert can patent it. Hence,
the entrepreneur cannot retaliate by implementing the idea herself.
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Alternatively, the expert (say x) could go to an expert competent relative to the other dimension,
describe her the idea and offer her to set up a partnership together.14 The latter can either accept
the offer or reject it. But at this stage, the second expert can also decide to undertake the project
herself, if she feels it profitable. Thus expert x also faces the risk of idea stealing. As stated in the
next proposition, this risk prevents the expert from successfully stealing the idea and implementing it
in collaboration with another expert.
Proposition 2: There is no equilibrium where expert x, after hearing the idea from the entrepre-
neur, would be able to contact another expert and undertake the project with her.
The intuition of this result is the following. Suppose expert x steals the idea, contacts an expert
competent in the other dimension, tells her the idea and offers her to form a partnership. If this
reveals x’s signal (as would be the case if x stole the idea only after observing a good signal), then
once she has been contacted by x, the second expert does not need x any longer. Hence if the idea is
profitable, she is better off implementing it alone rather than sharing its profit with x. Consider the
alternative case where x’s offer does not reveal his own signal, i.e., a candidate pooling equilibrium.
Then the second expert is willing to accept x’s offer only if, conditional on her own signal alone, the
project is expected to be profitable. However, in this case, she prefers to implement the idea alone
rather than to share its profits with x. Proposition 2 directly implies the following:
Proposition 3: Should one of the experts decide to conceal from the entrepreneur that he had a
good signal, the best he could do would be to undertake the project alone.
This is our first important result. After stealing the idea, the expert himself faces the risk of idea
stealing. Thus an expert who steals the idea can only undertake the project alone. This limits the
profitability of idea stealing, and increases the ability of an entrepreneur to reliably aggregate the
signals of the experts.
14This could be the expert initially contacted by the entrepreneur or another one.
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These results rely on the assumption that expertise is observable. If it was not, an expert in
dimension x could contact another expert, in dimension y, pretending to be technically incompetent.
While logically possible, we believe this is implausible. When approached and presented with a venture
proposition, expert y will naturally collect information about his potential business partner and be
able to find out if the latter is really ignorant.
Relying on Propositions 2 and 3, we can state the next proposition:
Proposition 4: The condition under which, after observing a good signal, expert i does not steal
the idea is:
πj [μϕi(H) + (1− μ)ϕi(h)− c] ≥ πj [μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πj)h− 2c, (i, j) ∈ {(x, y), (y, x)}. (4)
The left—hand side of inequality (4) is the expected profit of the expert if he truthfully reports
a good signal and joins the project. The right—hand side of the inequality is his expected profit if
he undertakes the project alone. This expected profit determines the level of the informational rent
which the entrepreneur must leave to the expert to prevent idea—stealing. If it is non positive, then
the experts do not obtain rents.
The determinants of the informational rents of the experts We consider next the comparative
statics of the economic variables determining the rents of the experts. The greater the development
cost, the less demanding the condition (4) under which neither the experts don’t steal the idea. We
can then state the following:
Proposition 5: The greater the development cost c, the more attractive it is for the experts to
join the partnership rather than undertaking the project alone, and the lower their informational rents.
For each expert, the advantage of joining the partnership is that it enables him to incur the
development cost only when the signal of the other expert is also good. This is especially attractive
when the development cost is large.
The condition under which expert x does not steal the idea can be rewritten as:
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2c− (1− πy)h
πy
≥ μ(H − ϕx(H)) + (1− μ)(h− ϕy(h)) + c.
The left-hand side is decreasing in πy. Hence the condition is more demanding if the probability that
the other expert observes a good signal is large. The lower this probability, the more likely it is that
ex ante the project has negative net value, and thus the more crucial it is to rely on the expertise of
y to avoid engaging in a loss—making project. Thus, we can state the following result:
Proposition 6: The less likely it is that the signal of expert y is positive, the less attractive it is
for expert x to undertake the project alone, and the lower the rent that expert x can obtain.
Low values of πx and πy corresponds to more “daring” ideas, which are ex—ante less likely to be
viable and for which a complete appraisal is more critical. In this case, the entrepreneur manages
to capture a greater fraction of value because she is essential in aggregating the critical signals.
Correspondingly, there is a threshold level for each expert beyond which the other expert cannot
undertake the project alone. Ats this point, it is convenient to define β as follows:
β =
2c− h
μ(H − h) . (5)
Relying on this notation, we state our next proposition:
Proposition 7: If the probability of a positive signal by expert y is sufficiently low, in the sense
that πy < β, then it never pays for agent x to steal the idea and implement the project alone.
On the other hand, if πy > β, then the right—hand—side of inequality (4) is strictly positive. So the
expert must be promised a rent to prevent idea—stealing. Hence we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 8: Expert x earns a rent, if and only if πy > β.
When is the partnership viable? We now examine under what conditions the partnership is
viable and the entrepreneur can aggregate the experts’ signals. We established that the entrepreneur
must concede expert x an informational rent to avoid idea—stealing when πy is relatively large. We will
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see that when πy and πx are large, the partnership is not viable. Without loss of generality consider
the case where: πx ≥ πy. In the following we spell out the three types of equilibria which can arise
when one expert, both or none are critical.
We consider first the case where the ex—ante expected value of the project is low and none of the
two experts could profitably undertake it alone. In this case the entrepreneur does not need to leave
rents to the experts. Information aggregation by the entrepreneur is facilitated, since both experts
need each other, and only the entrepreneur can arrange for them to commit to a partnership.
Proposition 9: If β > πx ≥ πy, experts earn no rents. In this case the entrepreneur con-
tacts the experts, the partnership is formed and the project is implemented when both experts observe
good signals. The entrepreneur captures the entire ex—ante expected net present value of the project:
πxπy[μH + (1− μ)h− 2(c+ L)].
Next we consider the case when only one expert could profitably undertake the project alone.
Proposition 10: If πx > β > πy, expert y must be left an information rent to discourage idea-
stealing; in contrast, expert x obtains no rent. In this case, the partnership is viable. Furthermore,
the ex—ante expected profit of the entrepreneur equals: (1− πx)πy[2c− h] > 0.
In that case, the expected profit of the entrepreneur is independent of H. Indeed, an increase in H
has two countervailing effects. On the one hand it increases the expected cash—flow from the project;
on the other hand it increases the rent which must be left to expert y. The proposition shows that
the two effects exactly offset each other. The result also implies that, when only one of the experts
earn rents, the residual expected profit left to the entrepreneur is sufficiently large to undertake the
project.
Next we consider the case where each of the two experts could undertake the project alone. This
case turns out to be the most challenging for the aggregation of signals.
Proposition 11: When πx > πy > β, then, if πy > πxπx(1+ 1β )−1
,the rents which must be left to the
experts are so large that it is no longer profitable for the entrepreneur to hire the experts to evaluate
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her idea. Otherwise, the entrepreneur will hire the two experts, and her ex-ante expected profit is:
2c(πy + πx − πyπx)− [(1− πy)πx + (1− πx)πy]h− πxπy(μH + (1− μ)h).
When πx and πy are large, idea stealing is too attractive and the entrepreneur cannot retain any
share of the surplus after contacting the experts. Thus there is a market breakdown: the innovative
idea is not implemented, even when its net present value is positive. This is in the line of Arrow’s
(1962) paradox. Also in that case, even if the entrepreneur can profitably implement the project, his
profit is decreasing in H. An increase in H makes the project more valuable, but it also raises the
informational rent of the experts. When πy > β informational rents are large, and the latter effect is
stronger than the former.
The different equilibrium outcomes arising for different values of the parameters are represented in
Figure 2. The figure illustrates that, when πx and πy are low, the project can be undertaken and the
entrepreneur can profitably exploit her innovative idea. In contrast, when πx and πy are high, there
is a market breakdown.
The key parameter of the equilibrium regions in Figure 2 is β. The smaller β, the lower the no—rent
region, and the greater the market breakdown region. Note that β is decreasing in the possible cash
flows from the project: H and h. This is in line with our above remark that large cash—flows make
idea stealing more attractive and thus exacerbate the problem faced by the entrepreneur.
Relying on the three propositions above, the following proposition (illustrated in Figure 3) char-
acterizes the evolution of the profit of the entrepreneur as H varies:15
Proposition 12: The expected profit of the entrepreneur is not monotonic in the high realization
of the cash flow, H.
Similarly, it is straightforward to show that the expected profit of the entrepreneur is not monotonic
in the a priori probabilities that the signals of the experts will be good: On the one hand, when these
15The upper and lower bounds on H in the figure reflect our assumptions that the project has negative net present
value before screening, and positive net present value conditionally on two good signals, respectively.
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probabilities are low, both experts need each other, and the entrepreneur captures the entire value of
the project. In that region, the expected profit of the entrepreneur is increasing in πx and πy. On
the other hand, when these probabilities are large, the experts could undertake the project alone, and
hence must be left a rent. When πx and πy are too large, we are in the market breakdown region and
the expected profit of the entrepreneur is zero.
Putting together the counter—intuitive results we obtained relative to i) the ex—ante probability of
success (πxπy) and ii) the level of payoffs, our model shows that the best ideas cannot be implemented
— because it is too tempting to steal them.
How does complementarity affect the ability of the entrepreneur to profitably undertake the
project? Recall that complementarity is related to the convexity of the payoff function H(., .). Con-
sider an increase in its degree of convexity, corresponding to a decrease of h to h− , compensated by
an increase of H to H + 1−μμ . In this case, β changes from
2c−h
μ(H−h) to
2c−h+
μ(H−h)+ . It is easy to see that
this is increasing in . Hence, we can state the next proposition:
Proposition 13: The more complementary the signals the smaller the region in the parameter
space for which there is a market breakdown.
The more complementarity the signals are, the more attractive it is for each expert to join the part-
nership to benefit from the value added by the signal of the other expert. This helps the entrepreneur
preventing idea—stealing.
What happens when the informational rents are so large that the entrepreneur cannot profitably
hire the two experts? In that case, since we assume that the ex—ante expected cash flow from the
project is below 2c, it would not be optimal for the entrepreneur to undertake the project alone,
without the advice of the experts.
Could the entrepreneur choose to go to only one expert, say x? Obviously this can lead to
undertaking the project only if it has positive net expected value when the expert has observed a
positive signal, that is: πy[μH + (1−μ)h] + (1− πy)h > 2c+L. In that case, consider the reaction of
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the expert after being presented the idea. If he observes a bad signal, then he has no incentive to lie.
But if he observes a good signal and joins the partnership, his expected gain is:
αx(πy[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πy)h)− c,
while if he steals the idea and implement it alone, his expected profit is:
πy[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πy)h− 2c.
The former is greater than the latter if and only if:
αx > 1−
c
πy[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πy)h
.
The participation constraint of the entrepreneur is:
(1− αx)(πy[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πy)h)− (c+ L) > 0.
Comparing the two conditions shows that satisfying the incentive compatibility condition prevents
from leaving the entrepreneur strictly positive profits. Thus, going to one expert only is not an
attractive course of action for the entrepreneur.
The interpretation is simple. It is advantageous for an expert to join the partnership only if by
doing so he can benefit from the advice of the other expert, and thus avoid to incur the development
cost when the idea is bad. This benefit cannot be obtained when the entrepreneur goes to see only
one expert.
Compensating the experts with financial claims Proposition 1 states that the compensation of
the experts must be increasing in the cash—flows from the project. We now characterize this compen-
sation more precisely. For simplicity focus on the case where the two experts have identically critical
signals (πx = πy = π). In that case, we obtain the following proposition:
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Proposition 14: The optimal direct mechanism can be implemented by offering the experts equity
or convertible debt.
Implementing the optimal mechanism with equity is consistent with interpreting it as a partnership.
That the mechanism can be implemented equivalently with equity or convertible debt underscores that,
in our simple model, the precise allocation of cash flows across states does not play a central role.
All that is required is that the claims’ payoff in the low state be sufficiently low to deter gambling,
and the total expected payoff be large enough to avoid idea stealing and enable the experts to break
even. Enriching the model could lead to sharper implications for financial contracts. For example,
if the implementation cost was (at least partly) unobservable, this would raise moral hazard issues.
Cash—flow sensitive claims, such as equity or options, would cope with these problems more effectively
that insensitive claims such as debt.
4 Robustness and discussion
Non binary signals The key argument in our analysis is that, when contacting another expert,
the idea—thief reveals his own signal was positive. One might wonder whether this stems from our
assumption that signals take only two values: bad or good. With a more complex, non—binary, signal
structure, could the expert—thief profitably contact another expert?
To study this point, we slightly relax our binary signal assumption. For simplicity, we let πx =
πy = π and μ = 1, and for expert y we keep the same signal structure as above. But, for expert x,
instead of two values, the signal can take three values: good, neutral or bad. To generate such a signal
structure in a simple way, we make the following assumption. With probability λ the expert receives
a precise signal. In that case, with probability π the project is good in the dimension of expertise of
x, and accordingly the signal is good. With probability 1− π, the project is bad, and so is the signal.
Furthermore, with probability 1 − λ, the agent receives an imprecise, neutral signal. In that case,
while the expert remains uninformed, the project is actually good in his dimension with probability π
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and bad with probability 1−π. Thus, the ex—ante probabillity that the project is viable in dimension
x is still π.
Conditionally on two good signals, the expected value of the project is H − 2c. Conditionally on
one good signal and one neutral signal it is (πH + (1− π)h)− 2c. Conditionally on a good signal and
a bad one, the expected value of the project is: h− 2c < 0. Conditionally on two neutral signals it is:
π2H − 2c < 0.
First consider the case where, conditionally on one neutral signal, the project cannot be profitable,
even if the other signal is good, i.e., (πH + (1 − π)h) − 2c < 0. In that case, after observing a
neutral signal, the first expert is not tempted to steal the idea and contact another expert. Therefore,
contacting another expert reveals that the idea—thief has observed a good signal, just like in our
analysis above.
Now turn to the case where (πH + (1− π)h)− 2c > 0, i.e., conditionally on a neutral signal, the
project would be profitable if the other signal turns out to be good. In that case, expert x could be
tempted to steal the idea after observing a good signal or a neutral one. Since, both of these types
would contact y, expert x would not fully reveal his own signal when approaching the other expert.
He would only reveal that he had observed a neutral or a good signal.
Of course, if y has observed a bad signal, he knows the project is unprofitable and idea stealing
is not an issue. But what if expert y has observed a good signal? If he accepts the offer of x, his
expected profit is:
π
λπ + (1− λ)αH − c.
If he lies to x, announces that his signal was bad, and undertakes the project alone his expected profit
is:
π
λπ + (1− λ)H − 2c.
Thus, a necessary condition for y not to steal the idea from x is:
1− α < c
H
(λ+
1− λ
π
). (6)
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On the other hand, a necessary condition for x to break even after observing a neutral signal is:
π(1− α)H − c > 0, that is:
1− α > c
H
1
π
. (7)
These two conditions are consistent only if:
c
H
(λ+
1− λ
π
) >
c
H
1
π
, (8)
which implies π > 1, a contradiction.
Hence, like in the case of binary signals, the idea—stealing expert cannot hope to benefit from the
expertise of the other expert to screen unprofitable ideas: When x contacts y, the latter infers that
the former has observed either a positive or a neutral signal. Once he has extracted that information,
y cannot obtain any additional benefit from collaborating with x. Hence he prefers to undertake the
project alone rather than sharing the rent with x. Anticipating this behavior, x realizes that, if he
steals the idea, he will not be able to benefit from any expertise in dimension y.
Would the experts sign a no—compete agreement before seeing the idea ? Could the
entrepreneur ask the experts to sign a broad no—compete agreement before showing them the idea?
This would prevent them from stealing the idea. As discussed above, such no—compete clauses are
difficult to enforce (see Besen and Raskind, 1991, for example). We now show that, even if they were
perfectly enforceable, they could be ineffective to solve the idea stealing problem, when the quality of
the entrepreneur’s idea is a priori uncertain.
Extending the model analyzed above, consider the case where with probability ν the idea of the
entrepreneur is promising, while with the complementary probability it is worthless. The potential
entrepreneur does not know if her idea is promising, but the experts, after being told the idea, im-
mediately find out if the idea is valueless. This is in line with the discrimination process followed
by venture capitalists (see e.g. Fenn, Liang and Prowse, 1995). Approximately 90% of the enterprise
projects they receive are immediately rejected. The remaining 10% are then inspected carefully (which
corresponds in our model to the evaluation of the project by the experts).
24
Suppose the entrepreneur contacts experts x and y, and asks them to sign a broad no—compete
clause before being presented the idea. Denote K the opportunity cost for the experts of the no—
compete clause. This is the opportunity cost of passing up all the other interesting projects they
might encounter later in this line of business. For simplicity, consider the case where π = πx, πy. Since
the no—compete clause prevents idea stealing, the entrepreneur can actually sell her idea to the two
experts, at price P ≥ 0, and allocate to each of them half of the its cash flows if:
νπ2[
μH + (1− μ)h
2
− c] > P +K.
The left—hand-side is the expected net present value of the cash—flows to be received by the expert,
while the right—hand—side is the cost borne by the expert. There is no positive price at which this
transaction can take place if:
ν <
K
π2[μH+(1−μ)h2 − c]
.
Thus the experts will not agree to sign a no—compete clause before seeing the idea if the a priori
probability that the entrepreneur’s idea is promising is small relative to the ratio of the opportunity
cost of this clause for the experts to the net present value of promising ideas.
What if the entrepreneur can commit to policies which are optimal ex—ante but not
renegociation—proof ex—post? So far we have focused on the renegotiation—proof policy according
to which the contract is implemented if and only if both experts report good signals. We now extend
our analysis to the case where the entrepreneur enjoys more commitment power. She can commit to
implement the project as soon as at least one of the two reports is positive. This would be consistent
with the view that entrepreneurs are obstinate and insist on undertaking their projects even when
they face reluctance and weak support. Such an attitude could be portrayed as irrational. Yet,
in our model, it can actually be ex—ante beneficial and enable the entrepreneur to efficiently deter
idea—stealing. For simplicity, we develop the analysis in the symmetric case where πx = πy = π.
25
As shown in the previous section, when π < β, experts are critical and the entrepreneur can reap
all the rents from the experts. In that case, it is optimal to commit to the first best investment policy
and implement the project only if both signals are good. Now turn to the case where π > β, so that
each of the experts could undertake the project alone as a monopolist. If the entrepreneur sticks to
the first best investment policy, her expected profit is positive if:
π <
2β
1 + β
. (9)
Hereafter, we study whether, when that condition does not hold, the entrepreneur can earn positive
expected profits by following a more aggressive investment policy. Consider the strategy of investing
as soon as one of the two experts reports a good signal. By construction, since the experts are not
critical, this yields positive social surplus ex—ante. This translates into positive ex—ante expected
profits for the entrepreneur if this surplus is greater than the rents which must be left to the experts
to deter idea—stealing.
Under this more aggressive investment policy, if one expert stole the idea and implemented it by
himself, his expected profit would be:
π(δH(2)− 2c) + (1− π)(h− 2c). (10)
δH(2) corresponds to the revenue earned by the expert when both he and the expert implement the
idea simultaneously. δ < 1 is a scaling factor reflecting the decline in the revenue of each firm due
to competition. This decline in revenue reduces the attractiveness of idea stealing for the expert.
Manipulating equation (10) shows that the expected profit of the stealing expert is negative if:
δ <
2c− (1− π)h
πH(2)
≡ δ∗ ∈ [0, 1].
When δ < δ∗, under the aggressive investment policy experts earn no rent. Thus, by committing to
implementing the project as soon as one signal is good, the entrepreneur is able to capture the entire
social surplus and earn positive expected profits. This contrasts with the case where the entrepreneur
cannot commit to non renegociation—proof policies, whereby she could not reap any benefits from her
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idea. When competition significantly reduces the profits of the firm, by commiting to enter as soon
as one signal is good, the entrepreneur “occupies the grounds” and deters entry by the experts.
What happens when δ > δ∗? In that case, the expected profit of the entrepreneur, equal to the
social surplus generated by the project minus the experts’ rents is:
[π2(H(2)− 2c) + 2π(1− π)(h− 2c)]− 2π[π(δH(2)− c) + (1− π)(h− c)]. (11)
This is positive if:
δ <
1
2
− (1− π
π
)
c
H(2)
≡ δ∗∗.
Thus, if δ∗ < δ < δ∗∗, when following the aggressive investment policy the entrepreneur earns positive
expected profits. In contrast, if δ > Max[δ∗, δ∗∗], this policy is unprofitable for the entrepreneur. Our
results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 15: When π < 2β1+β , if the entrepreneur can commit to the aggressive policy of
investing as soon as one of the signals is good, she can obtain positive expected profits if the product
market is competitive enough ( δ < Max[δ∗, δ∗∗]). In that case there can be overinvestment, in the
sense that the entrepreneur can engage with one expert only in projects with large failure rate. In
contrast, if δ > Max[δ∗, δ∗∗], there is a market breakdown, i.e., there is underinvestment.
5 Empirical Implications
Our theoretical analysis highlights the role of the complementarity of expert signals in mitigating
the risk of idea stealing. It shows how partnerships should be designed to exploit these features. It
also generates predictions on the link between expert complementarity and the distribution of ex post
returns, as well as expert compensation. In this section we discuss in turn: i) what variables one could
use to proxy for complementarity and what type of dataset could be used to measure these variables,
and ii) the implications of our model for the joint distribution of these variables.
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Measurement and data First consider complementarity. Experts with similar backgrounds, e.g.,
two suppliers of computer systems, are less likely to be strongly complementary than experts coming
from different backgrounds, such as, e.g., a computer systems specialist and an expert in marketing of
software. But, high—tech ventures will involve experts from similar fields of expertise (e.g. genetists
in bio-tech ventures) as long as their knowledge in the area is complementary and necessary for the
elaboration of the product. To empirically test our theory, one could use data on the identity of the
founding stakeholders of innovative partnerships, which in our model contribute their expertise to the
project: What is their line of business, their education, or their prior experience? In which other firms
do they hold stakes? What types of products or services (if any) do they supply to the firm? Relying
on such information, one could construct a scale to measure complementarity.
In our theoretical framework, ideas with highly complementary signals are not very valuable when
only one of the two signals is positive. For such ideas a good fit along the different dimensions is
indispensable to create significant value.16 This is not unlike the O-ring theory developed by Kremer
(1993), positing a production function with many tasks, which must each be successfully completed for
the product to have value. This is likely to be the case when success requires different, highly specific,
technical or scientific expertises to screen and develop the basic design. Thus, complex high—technology
projects are likely to be strongly complementary.
Now consider innovativeness. A “highly novel” idea is one with a very low ex—ante probability
of success. In the language of the model, this implies a very low chance of a positive signals on at
least some dimension. In other words, an idea is novel if at least one of its aspect is highly unlikely.
Ideas with low chance of success on all dimensions must be seen as positively “improbable” concepts.17
When successful, they are likely to be “breakthrough ideas.” Presumably, more obvious ideas (namely,
ideas which are likely to succeed without much screening, given the stock of existing knowledge) are
16This corresponds to the case when h is low, so that the function H(n) is more convex in the number of positive
signals.
17Arguably, the chance of success depends on current technological or market knowledge. Novel ideas may then emerge
as knowledge becomes sufficiently refined to define them, or to evaluate them.
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easier to develop. This ease of evaluation suggests that they resemble other existing products. Hence,
they should be less profitable. As a result, “daringness” and idea value in case of success, H, should be
positively correlated, since a high return is likely only when the concept is very different from existing
products.
Testable implications Our analysis implies that, to reduce idea—stealing, experts should be in-
volved as early partners, not as consultants.18 Our model also highlights that complementarity re-
duces the risk of idea stealing, as it provides incentives for specialists to join the partnership, to benefit
from the expertise of the others (see Proposition 13). Thus, innovation should be more frequent when
it relies on complementary dimensions of expertise. In a cross—section of firms, other things equal,
partnerships involving experts with complementary expertise should be more innovative than firms
without such expertise in the managing team.
Our model also implies that associating experts to the partnership enhances its chances of success.
This is consistent with the evidence discussed by Bhide (2000). Our analysis implies that, other things
equal, the likelihood that the project will be successful increases with the number of experts associated
with the partnership. Furthermore, the greater the complementarity between the experts, the more
positive the effect of the number of experts on the likelihood of success.
Yet, another implication of our theory is that signal complementarity reduces the rents which must
be left to the experts. Hence, other things equal, the fraction of the shares of the company allocated
to the experts is predicted to decrease in the level of complementarity. Thus, ceteris paribus the
stake for the initial entrepreneur (vis a vis, say a pure financier) should be higher in high technology
projects with high complexity. Also, experts with more critical expertise should get a higher stake in
the partnership than partners with more trivial expertise.
To illustrate the empirical implications of our theory, it is useful to consider two polar cases. The
18Traditional consultant groups are relatively less active in the Silicon Valley than advisors who often take shares
in payment. An example is the marketing “guru” Regis McKenna, who provided his expert advice to many hi—tech
ventures.
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first one corresponds to “daring” ideas, which are both complex and novel, and thus exhibit high
complementarity. Such ideas have a high a priori chance to fail, but, if successful, should be quite
profitable, precisely because they represent a radical departure from existing practices. Our model
implies that these highly innovative, complex and risky projects require highly specialized experts,
joining the firm as early partners.
The opposite polar case corresponds to simple, incremental ideas which are likely to succeed and
do not require a precise coincidence of signals. Our theoretical analysis implies that such ideas, with
low complexity and complementarity, are very vulnerable to be stolen. They will tend to emerge in
older technology sectors, or in consumer oriented products. While their return is safer, it is likely to
be low. We would then predict that such ideas would be often implemented with limited screening,
and thus with fewer or no expert partners. The original team may include only individuals connected
to the innovator by some loyalty links, and thus be likely to be drawn from friend or family circles.
6 Conclusion
Following Schumpeter, we have modelled new ideas as novel combinations of existing productive
means. Evaluating such new ideas is quite different from valuing an existing asset, whose use is
already observable. A new idea has by definition never been implemented, so its features cannot be
compared with previous experiences. In the words of Schumpeter (1926): “Outside the usual path,
economic agents cannot rely on the data which are available for routine decisions... They can and
should forecast and assess ... but in many respects things are quite uncertain.”
One crucial question is whether the different aspects of the proposed new combination can be
functionally combined. Evaluating this requires experts drawn from the distinct dimensions of the
project, whose signals are complementary rather than additive. To screen good ideas, the innovative
entrepreneur must first identify the critical ingredients of her business concept. Then, she must
aggregate privately observed expert opinions along each complementary dimension of the idea, while
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controlling the incentives experts have to steal the idea. To do so, she offers them to join a partnership.
We identify a potential market breakdown, in which a partnership is not viable because stealing the
idea is too tempting for the experts. The entrepreneur can successfully avoid such opportunistic
actions if each expert is better off joining the partnership to benefit from the advice of the other
expert, rather than undertaking the project on his own. This requires that at least one of the expert
signals be critical for the success of the project or that the degree of complementarity in the two
dimensions of the project be very high. Both conditions relate to the size of the gain in cooperating
with other experts.
Our theoretical analysis yields a variety of empirical implications. For example it predicts that
innovative projects should associate complementary experts as partners rather than consultants, that
associating experts to the partnership enhances its chances of success, and that the stake for the initial
entrepreneur should be higher in high—technology enterprises with high complexity and complemen-
tarities. It would be interesting to test these implications with data on innovative new firms.
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Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: There are three candidate equilibria where x would contact y and offer
her a share α of the project:19
First, consider a candidate separating equilibrium where x would offer y a share αG after observing
good news and a share αB after bad news: In that case, when she is offered αG, y realizes that x has
observed a good signal. Would she be interested in collaborating with x when she has observed a good
signal ? No. After observing a good signal, y would be better off reporting a bad signal to walk away
19For simplicity we consider only the case where the first expert offers the other expert a share of the project, i.e., an
equity stake. In our simple model, allowing for more general contracts would not alter the result. Also for simplicity we
focus on pure strategies equilibria.
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from x, implement the project by herself, and earn the entire value of the project: μH+(1−μ)h−2c.
Anticipating this reaction, x does not find it attractive to share the idea with y after observing a good
signal.
Now consider the case where x would offer αB to y. After observing a bad signal, y would reject
this offer because she would know the project cannot yield any cash flow. After observing a good
signal, she could accept x’s offer only if: αBh − c > 0, that is: αB > ch . On the other hand, x’s
rationality condition requires that:
(1− αB)h− c > 0⇔ 1− αB >
c
h
⇔ 1− c
h
> αB.
Together, the two conditions imply that: h > 2c,which contradicts our assumptions. Hence, there is
no separating equilibrium where x could collaborate with y by offering her a share αG after observing
good news and a share αB after bad news.
Second, consider a candidate equilibrium where the expert would steal the idea and contact another
expert only after observing a good signal.20 In that case, the second expert infers the signal of the
first expert from the mere fact that she is contacted. Following the same logic as in the first candidate
equilibrium, in this context the first expert cannot avoid idea stealing.
Third consider a candidate pooling equilibrium where x would contact y and offer her a share
irrespective of his own signal. Could expert y accept this offer after observing a negative signal? In
that case, her individual rationality condition would imply: απxh > c⇔ α > cπxh .On the other hand,
the individual rationality condition of expert x after observing a bad signal would imply: (1−α)πyh >
c⇔ 1−α > cπyh ⇔ 1−
c
πyh > α.The two conditions together imply: 1−
c
πxh >
c
πyh ⇔ 1 >
c
πyh+
c
πxh .In
turn this implies: 1 > 2ch ,which contradicts our assumptions. Hence, there is no pooling equilibrium
where y accepts the offer when she has observed a bad signal.
Could there be an equilibrium where she would accept the offer only after observing a good signal?
This would require that she prefers to accept the offer than to undertake the project alone, i.e.:
20Stealing the idea to undertake it only after observing a bad signal is obviously not a profitable strategy.
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α[πx(μH + (1− μ)h) + (1− πx)h]− c > πx(μH + (1− μ)h) + (1− πx)h− 2c. This is equivalent to:
c
[πx(μH + (1− μ)h) + (1− πx)h]
> 1− α.
On the other hand, the individual rationality of expert x, if he has observed a bad signal, is:πy[(1−
α)h − c] > 0, i.e., 1 − α > ch .The two conditions imply that:
c
πx(μH+(1−μ)h)+(1−πx)h >
c
h ,that is:
πyh > πx(μH + (1− μ)h) + (1− πx)h⇔ h > H,a contradiction.
QED
Proof of Proposition 9: Since none of the experts can undertake the project alone, their incentive
compatibility condition in the good state does not bind. Hence, the program of the entrepreneur is to
maximize:
πyπx[μ(H − ϕx(H)− ϕy(H)) + (1− μ)(h− ϕx(h)− ϕy(h))],
under the incentive compatibility condition of the experts in the bad state: ϕk(h) < c, k ∈ {i, j},and
the rationality conditions of the experts: μϕi(H) + (1 − μ)ϕi(h) ≥ c for i ∈ {x, y}.Saturating
the rationality condition, and substituting it in the objective of the entrepreneur, the latter becomes:
πyπx[μH + (1− μ)h− 2c],i.e., the command variables cancel out, and the entrepreneur earns positive
profits. Hence, any transfer function satisfying the rationality conditions is an optimum. For example,
set: ϕk(h) = h/2, k ∈ {i, j}.Thus, the incentive compatibility condition in the bad state holds, and
the rationality condition becomes: μϕi(H)+ (1−μ)h2 = c for i ∈ {x, y},that is:21 ϕi(H) =
c− 1−μ
2
h
μ
for i ∈ {x, y}.
QED
Proof of Proposition 10: Since only expert y is critical, her incentive compatibility condition
in the good state binds, while for expert x, we only need to impose the rationality condition. Hence,
21Note that this is consistent with limited liability since, with ϕk(h) = h/2, k ∈ {i, j}, the expected profit of the
entrepreneur is: πyπx[μ(H − ϕx(H)− ϕy(H))]. That this profit is positive implies that: H > ϕx(H)− ϕy(H).
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the program of the entrepreneur is to maximize:
πyπx[μ(H − ϕx(H)− ϕy(H)) + (1− μ)(h− ϕx(h)− ϕy(h))],
under the incentive compatibility condition of the experts in the bad state: ϕk(h) < c, k ∈ {i, j},the
rationality condition of the expert x: μϕx(H) + (1 − μ)ϕx(h) ≥ c,and y0s incentive compatibility
condition in the good state:
πx[μϕy(H) + (1− μ)ϕy(h)− c] ≥ πx[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πx)h− 2c.
Let these incentive rationality conditions hold as equalities and substitute them in the objective of the
entrepreneur, the latter simplifies to: πy(1− πx)(2c− h).Here also the command variables cancel out,
and the entrepreneur earns positive profits. Hence, any transfer function satisfying the rationality
condition of x, and the incentive compatibility condition of y is an optimum. For example, set:
ϕk(h) = h/2, k ∈ {i, j}.Thus, the incentive compatibility condition in the bad state holds, and the
rationality condition of x becomes: ϕx(H) =
c− 1−μ
2
h
μ .The incentive compatibility condition of y in the
good state becomes: ϕy(H) = H +
1−μ
μ h/2 +
1−πx
μπx h −
c
μ(
2
πx − 1),which pins down the value of the
transfer to y in that state.22
QED
Proof of Proposition 11: Since none of the experts is critical, their incentive compatibility
conditions in the good state bind. Hence, the program of the entrepreneur is to maximize:
πyπx[μ(H − ϕx(H)− ϕy(H)) + (1− μ)(h− ϕx(h)− ϕy(h))],
under the incentive compatibility condition of the experts in the bad state: ϕk(h) < c, k ∈ {i, j},and
their incentive compatibility condition in the good state:
πi[μϕj(H) + (1− μ)ϕj(h)− c] ≥ πi[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− πi)h− 2c, (i, j) ∈ {(x, y), (y, x)}.
22Again, note that these transfers are consistent with limited liability.
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Let the latter hold as equalities:
μϕy(H) + (1− μ)ϕy(h) = [μH + (1− μ)h] +
1− πx
πx
h− c( 2
πx
− 1),
μϕx(H) + (1− μ)ϕx(h) = [μH + (1− μ)h] +
1− πy
πy
h− c( 2
πy
− 1),
Substituting these equalities in the objective of the entrepreneur, the latter becomes:
πyπx[−[μH + (1− μ)h]−
1− πx
πx
h+ c(
2
πx
− 1)− 1− πy
πy
h+ c(
2
πy
− 1)],
This is negative if:
μH + (1− μ)h+ 1− πx
πx
h+
1− πy
πy
h > 2c(
1
πx
+
1
πy
− 1),
which is equivalent to the condition stated in the proposition.
It only remains to propose a transfer function. Set: ϕk(h) = h/2, k ∈ {i, j}.The incentive compat-
ibility condition becomes:
ϕy(H) = [H +
1− μ
μ
h
2
] +
1− πx
πx
h
μ
− c
μ
(
2
πx
− 1),
ϕx(H) = [H +
1− μ
μ
h
2
] +
1− πy
πy
h
μ
− c
μ
(
2
πy
− 1),
which pins down the value of the transfers.23
QED
Proof of Proposition 14: First consider the case of equity financing: The entrepreneur offers
each of the experts a fraction α of the revenues of the project. First consider the case where the
experts are critical (π < β). Their participation constraint binds. Hence: α = cμH+(1−μ)h .Our positive
NPV assumption implies that α < 1/2. It only remains to check that this is consistent with the no
gambling condition: αh < c.Substituting the value of α obtained from the break even constraint, the
23Again, note that this is consistent with limited liability.
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no gambling condition holds iff: chμH+(1−μ)h < c.This amounts to h < μH + (1− μ)h which obviously
holds.
Second consider the case where the experts are not critical (π > β). Their no stealing condition
is:
π[α(μH + (1− μ)h)− c] ≥ π[μH + (1− μ)h] + (1− π)h− 2c.
That is:
α ≥ 1−
2−π
π c−
1−π
π h
(μH + (1− μ)h) .
By construction, when there is no market breakdown, the right hand side is lower than one half. Thus
the no stealing condition is is consistent with the no gambling condition iff:
c
h
≥ 1−
2−π
π c−
1−π
π h
(μH + (1− μ)h) ,
which holds since the right—hand side is lower than 1 and c > h.
Now, turn to the case of convertible bonds. The details of the face value of the bond, the conversion
rate and the exercise strategies are as follows: As shown in the proofs above, the transfer to the experts
when the cash flow is low can be set to: ϕk(h) = h/2, k ∈ {i, j}.The transfer to the experts when the
cash flow is high is: ϕk(H), k ∈ {i, j}. Set the conversion rate of the bond to: γk = ϕk(H)/H. Each
of the two experts rationally expects the other expert to convert his (or her) bond in the high cash
flow state. Thus, each expert expects to obtain: γkH = ϕk(H) if he (or she) converts. Since, as stated
in the previous proposition, the transfer function is increasing in the cash flow from the project, the
payoff obtained in state H by each expert if he (or she) converts: γkH = ϕk(H), is greater than what
he (or she) obtains when not converting: ϕk(h) =
h
2 . Thus, both experts indeed prefer to convert in
state H.
QED
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Figure 1: The expected cash flow function
Expected Cash Flow
Number of 
good signals
(out of 2): n0 1 2
h
μH+(1-μ)h
The multiplicative case:
h=0.
The additive case: h=[μ/(1+μ)]H.
The general case:
0<h<[μ/(1+μ)]H.
βπx
πyβ
Both experts 
are critical
Neither expert 
is critical
Only expert x is 
critical
Only 
expert y 
is critical
Market breakdown
Figure 2: Criticality & feasibility of the partnership
Figure 3: The expected profit of the entrepreneur
H
Expected profit of
the entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs’
profit is:
πxπx(μH+
(1−μ)h-2c).
Entrepreneur ’s profit is:
2c(πx+πy-πxπy)- πxπy(μH+(1-μ)h) -((1- πx)πy +(1-πy) πx)h.
Project is not undertaken,
because rents which must 
be left to experts to deter 
idea stealing
are too high.
Entrepreneur ’s profit is:
(1- πx)πy (2c-h).
Experts earn 
no rents
Expert x earn rents, 
not expert y
Both experts 
earn rents
